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Abstract 
Small island states were able to obtain some remarkable achievements in the climate 
change negotiations by building a cohesive coalition, the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS). The cohesion of the Alliance, however, has been affected by changes in the 
UNFCCC process. The multiplication of issues on the climate agenda and the increasing 
number of negotiation groups may help or hinder compromise and finding common 
ground.  
To track how AOSIS has fared in the climate change regime, this paper compares the 
activities and positions of AOSIS as a group, and of individual AOSIS members over three 
distinct periods in the climate change regime: its early phase from 1995 to 2000; an 
implementation phase from 2001 to 2005; and the more recent period from 2006 to 2011. 
Over time, group activity has declined in relative terms, with some issues such as forestry 
receiving particular attention from individual AOSIS members. Despite controversies in 
some areas, AOSIS has remained a tightly coordinated and cohesive alliance that 
continues to be a key player in global climate policy.  
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1. Introduction 
When, in 1990, island countries worldwide recognised the disproportionate vulnerability 
of their territories and populations to the negative consequences of climate change, they 
came together in a negotiating group, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). 
AOSIS’s main purpose is to defend island interests in the international negotiations under 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), where it 
can point to some remarkable accomplishments. Despite the smallness and lack of 
political clout of its members, AOSIS has become one of the key players in the UNFCCC 
negotiations. This recognition itself is a notable success for island microstates. Further 
achievements include the specific small island developing states (SIDS) seat on the various 
bodies established under the Convention and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol, or, more recently, 
consideration to strengthen the goal of keeping global temperature rises below 1.5°C. 
Much of this success is related to SIDS forming a tight coalition that allowed members to 
overcome some of their individual limitations and make their voice heard (Ashe, et al., 
1999; Betzold, 2010; McMahon, 1993).  
Since the foundation of AOSIS, however, the UNFCCC process has undergone 
profound changes. Not only are more and more issues placed under the ever-growing 
climate change agenda; also, more and more country groups are formed in the 
negotiations, with diverging positions on the various agenda items. By now, a plethora of 
overlapping country groups exist in the negotiations (see Figure 1), from single-issue 
coalitions like the Coalition of Rainforest Nations founded in 2005, to the leftist 
Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of our Americas (ALBA) created in 2004.  
--- figure 1 about here --- 
Presumably, this growth in coalitions makes it more difficult for any one of them to 
get their voice heard; similarly, the multiplication of issues has implications for the 
coordination among coalition members. On the one hand, it may be more difficult to find 
common ground as individual interests and concerns on specific agenda items become 
more visible. On the other hand, and quite to the contrary, the multiplication of topics 
may facilitate compromising through issue linkages and side payments.   
This paper hence takes the fragmentation of the negotiating process as its starting point 
and asks to what extent the multiplication of issues as well as country groups has affected 
AOSIS. Has the cohesiveness of the Alliance, one of its key characteristics and strengths, 
diminished over time, as issues multiplied and differences among members may have 
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become more visible? Or, to the contrary, has group cohesion remained stable or even 
increased as a broader agenda has given compromising more space? Or alternatively, does 
group cohesion reassert itself on the most fundamental questions such as mitigation 
commitments, even when more complex relationships are at play? 
In order to map common positions as well as differences in views and priorities over 
time, at least as far as they appear to wider audiences, this article relies on public data 
available for the entire period of analysis, including official submissions from AOSIS 
members; reports of the negotiations in the Earth Negotiations Bulletin; and the lists of 
participants to selected meetings. It compares these sources over three distinct periods in 
the climate change regime: its early phase from 1995 to 2000; an implementation phase 
from 2001 to 2005; and the recent period from 2006 to 2011 focusing on a follow-up to 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and its first commitment period. Information obtained from 
interviews with delegates backs up some of the findings for the most recent period. 
The data indicate changes over time. First, submissions and interventions as a group 
have decreased relative to individual activities. Differences in positions become more 
evident when looking at specific issue areas, particularly those related to Land Use, Land-
Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation (REDD). Possibly, this suggests that, while AOSIS still remains a 
fairly tight negotiating coalition, it has become more difficult to uphold unity. 
The next section briefly surveys existing literature on AOSIS in the climate change 
negotiations; followed by insights on coalition and group cohesion from negotiation 
theory and an overview over the data and methods used. Section 5 compares then 
AOSIS's positions generally, as well as with regard to adaptation, mitigation, LULUCF 
and REDD, over the three periods outlined above. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. AOSIS’ sources of negotiation success 
Despite important differences in terms of culture, language, and geography, SIDS face 
common challenges, including their disproportionate vulnerability to the adverse effects 
of climate change (Kelman and West, 2009; Mimura, et al., 2007; Wong, 2011). Early on, 
island states worldwide recognized this commonality, as well as the need for inter-regional 
cooperation, given their very limited individual economic and political clout. 
Consequently, under the leadership of the Maldives, Vanuatu and Trinidad and Tobago, 
24 island states from all UN regions formed AOSIS in 1990 as a trans-regional, informal 
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coalition in the negotiations for the UNFCCC (Chasek, 2005; Heileman, 1993; Taplin, 
1994).  
Since then, membership has increased to currently 39 full members (AOSIS, 2011; Fry, 
2005) that work together largely based on consultation and coordination (Honoré, 2004, 
p. 7).1 Although AOSIS has somewhat broadened its scope (see Chasek, 2005; Fry, 2005), 
its main focus remains on the climate change negotiations. Here, AOSIS is by now 
recognized as a major player (Yamin and Depledge, 2004) – no small feat for these 
microstates that, even combined, have less than 1% each of world territory, population, 
GDP, and greenhouse gas emissions.2 Beyond recognition, the Alliance can point to some 
remarkable accomplishments. Most prominently, SIDS obtained a seat on the Bureau, a 
position that until then had been the privilege of the five UN regional groups.3 AOSIS has 
managed to perpetuate this key achievement, and managed to obtain a SIDS seat in other 
UNFCCC bodies, such as the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) or the boards of the Adaptation Fund or the Green Climate Fund.4 
Early studies on the UNFCCC process thus ascribe considerable influence to AOSIS. 
Davis (1996, p. 18), for instance, argues that "these small and relatively powerless 
developing states have managed to exert a profound and continuing impact on global 
climate policy" while former AOSIS negotiators Ashe et al. (1999, p. 209) even claim that 
the UNFCCC "represented a singular triumph [for AOSIS]" (see also Betzold, 2010; 
Shibuya, 1996; Taplin, 1994). 
Several factors have been identified as important in explaining the remarkable 
influence of these otherwise fairly powerless countries. Davis (1996) lists four main 
factors: the "truth and justness of its cause" (p. 19), the support by the best available 
scientific evidence, the Alliance's sense of unity due to the common threat of climate 
change, and the strong and skilled leadership by AOSIS's first chair, ni-Vanuatu 
ambassador Robert Van Lierop. What Davis calls "truth and justness" is generally referred 
to as vulnerability. This extreme sensitivity of small islands to the consequences of climate 
change gives AOSIS moral leverage. Larson (2003, 2005) hence argues that AOSIS 
successfully highlighted their strong exposure to changing climatic conditions, as well as 
the negative effects of climate change for all countries worldwide, which helped to forge 
coalitions with more powerful groups of countries, especially the EU and more 
progressive countries within the G-77 and China. In a similar vein, the group’s former 
vice-chair Tiuloma Neroni Slade (2003, p. 534) underlines the cooperative nature and 
consensus orientation of small island state diplomacy more generally, as well as the 
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inclination toward coalitions and like-minded countries. He notes that islands 
"instinctively [...] recognise strength in acting together, whether as regional sub-groups of 
the Caribbean or Pacific countries, or as the larger Alliance of Small Island States". 
These soft negotiation strategies also figure prominently in Betzold (2010). According 
to her analysis of the climate regime up to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, AOSIS managed to 
highlight common interests, raise moral concerns, as well as "play by the rules". AOSIS as 
a group early on participated very actively in the process, was well prepared and enjoyed a 
first-mover advantage vis-à-vis other groups (see also Ashe, et al., 1999; McMahon, 1993). 
This early full participation, however, was only possible by forming a coalition and 
pooling resources, since SIDS individually have limited negotiating capacity, with many 
of their delegations consisting only of one or two representatives (e.g. Chasek, 2005; 
McMahon, 1993; McNamara and Gibson, 2009). 
Participation as a bloc is important for AOSIS’s influence, but it is not always easy to 
find a common denominator among 39 countries. Despite their common vulnerability, 
small island states are threatened by climate change in different ways. Whereas some states 
that consist exclusively of low-lying atolls such as the Maldives, Kiribati or Tuvalu, have 
to worry about their very existence as states (Yamamoto and Esteban, 2010), other 
countries face serious impacts in coastal zones, but may be able to adapt, such as Belize or 
Cuba. Similarly, climate regulations affect AOSIS members differently. With large 
tropical forest covers, countries like Papua New Guinea, Suriname or Guyana are 
interested in compensation payments as part of REDD, while others, in particular 
Singapore with its large harbour, have a special interest in bunker fuels and maritime 
transport. In other words, as the UNFCCC process increases in scope and complexity, 
different and potentially diverging interests should become more pronounced. 
 
3. Coalitions in Multilateral Negotiations 
What do such lines of divergence imply from a theoretical perspective? The literature 
on coalitions in multilateral negotiations highlights two opposite effects of an increase in 
the number of issues and interests on coalition cohesion. On the one hand, a broader 
agenda provides more opportunities for divergent interests to appear, and thus hinders 
reaching common ground (e.g. Constantini, et al., 2007). On the other hand, it has been 
argued, adding issues might in fact facilitate compromising by allowing for issue linkages 
and side payments (Sebenius, 1984).  
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Coalitions are a defining feature of multilateral negotiations. As soon as there are more 
than two parties, negotiators start forming groups (Dupont, 1996). The main purpose of 
such groups is to increase the individual members’ negotiating power and thus their 
potential gains (Starkey, et al., 2008). The increase in bargaining power, however, comes 
at a price. Since the coalition's position is a compromise of the positions of all coalition 
members, this price can be relatively high when an individual coalition member’s ideal 
policy is far from the coalition’s joint position. In contrast, the cost will be lower the 
closer individual preferences are to the overall common position. Building and 
maintaining a coalition is thus easier among homogeneous members (Axelrod, 1970; 
Constantini, et al., 2007; Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996).  
In single-issue negotiations, it should be relatively easy to identify common interests 
and agree on a common position. In contrast, more issues provide more opportunities for 
diverging interests to appear among coalition members, and thus make it more difficult to 
hold the collective together. From this perspective, it might be expected that it has, over 
time, become more difficult for AOSIS to uphold its unity. Since AOSIS countries differ 
in how climate change affects them, they value certain issues very differently, and their 
individual interest may thus be relatively far from the coalition position, at least in certain 
areas. Furthermore, with a better understanding of climate change and its implications as 
well as of the negotiation process, individual states may be better aware of their interests 
and how they relate to group positions. Lines of divergence may thus be expected to be 
more visible now as compared to the early years of the climate change regime, when 
uncertainty was even more prevalent.5 
On the other hand, it has been proposed that adding issues may in fact help 
compromising. More issues that are negotiated simultaneously provide opportunities for 
issue linkages and side payments. Thus, if country A is reluctant to agree to the joint 
position on one issue, the coalition might be able to get that support by in return 
promising A to support it on another issue that is valued highly by A (Sebenius, 1984).  
Such exchanges, however, are only possible if there are many, differently valued issues 
on the agenda. Hence, cooperation across many issues is used to explain why very 
heterogeneous groups like the Group of 77 (G77) have been able to maintain cooperation 
despite diverse interests (e.g. Najam, 2004; Vihma, et al., 2011).  
According to this line of reasoning, then, AOSIS unity should not have suffered from 
the multiplication of issues on the UNFCCC agenda. Because AOSIS members value 
different items differently, adding them onto the agenda opens up room for compromise, 
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and hence facilitates coalition maintenance. Further, the growing certainty of climate 
change may, rather than highlight divergences, in fact serve to emphasize the overarching 
common interest: a strong climate change regime in the face of island vulnerability.  
 
4. Data and Methods 
The empirical analysis compares three distinct periods of negotiations: 
‐ A first period from 1995 to 2000 centred on the design of the Kyoto Protocol. 
‐ A second period from 2001 to 2005, starting with the Marrakesh Accords that focused 
negotiations on the detailed rules and operationalization of the Kyoto Protocol and its 
flexibility mechanisms. 
‐ A third period from 2006 to 2010, in which the focus shifted to negotiations about a 
second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol and an eventual new protocol. 
For such a comparison, data on the negotiations since 1995 is needed. Therefore, the 
paper relies on submissions by AOSIS and its member states to the UNFCCC as well as 
lists of participants to key negotiation sessions. This material is supplemented with 
negotiation summaries as published in the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) as well as 
interviews with AOSIS negotiators.  
Governments, usually upon request, provide submissions to share views and 
perspectives on specific topics, and to allow chairs and the Secretariat to compile text for 
negotiations. All submissions by AOSIS and its member states were manually coded in 
terms of their author(s), possible co-authors, as well as content based on the general topic 
and word counts of specific markers as listed in table 1.6  
--- table 1 about here ---- 
For UNFCCC meetings in years in which major stepping stones in the climate regime 
were achieved (table 2)7, information about the composition of AOSIS delegations was 
extracted.8 For each AOSIS delegate, information on the type of their affiliation 
(government or non-governmental) as well as their detailed background (e.g. type of 
ministry for governmental delegates) was coded.  
--- table 2 about here ---- 
For the period between COP13 in Bali (December 2007) and COP15 in Copenhagen 
(December 2009), summaries of the open negotiation sessions from the ENB 
(International Institute for Sustainable Development, IISD, 2007-2009) were also hand-
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coded. Count variables were created that provide information on how often a country 
made an intervention on a specific negotiation topic, and how often statements were 
supported or opposed by another country (see Castro, et al., 2011).9  
Finally, interviews conducted in the context of the wider study on climate change 
negotiations (Weiler, 2012, in this issue), were analysed to get some more insight into 
individual country positions in the current round of negotiations and their relationship to 
AOSIS.  
A comparison of the group with the individual country level can map differences in 
views and priorities, as well as changes over time and across issue areas, at least as 
portrayed to wider audiences in the submissions and interventions. It is clear that this 
material does not convey information on internal processes, with much of the 
negotiations occurring behind closed doors, nor does it provide insights on motivations 
behind observed changes. Nonetheless, the picture obtained through this analysis provides 
a useful starting point for tracking the evolution of AOSIS over time. 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1. AOSIS’ and AOSIS members’ interests over time 
Written submissions 
--- figure 2 about here --- 
Figure 2 shows developments in the amount of written submissions sent by AOSIS 
and its member countries to the UNFCCC in the three periods of analysis. Three types of 
submissions were differentiated: those made by AOSIS as a group; those made by 
individual AOSIS members; and those by AOSIS members jointly with other countries 
(which may or may not be AOSIS members themselves).10 In the first two periods (i.e. 
between 1995 and 2005), most submissions were made by AOSIS as a group, with 
relatively few individual or joint submissions. From 2006 on, however, the majority of 
AOSIS countries have made at least one submission independently of AOSIS. While 
AOSIS group submissions are still high in number, their proportion, when compared to 
the individual or joint submissions, has declined notably.  
Most active are Belize, Papua New Guinea, Singapore and Tuvalu, with several 
countries also having a relatively high amount of joint submissions.11 The Dominican 
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Republic, for example, frequently makes submissions with other Latin American 
countries outside AOSIS, and did so already in the 1990s.  
With regard to content, the main topic of the submissions as well as an analysis of 
keywords12 yield a similar picture. Figure 3 shows changes in the relative importance of 
the different main topics over time. In general, topics related to climate mitigation were 
very important in the 1990s in the run-up to Kyoto and again from 2006 on. Among these 
topics, LULUCF and the CDM, that is, the detailed rules about how to operationalize the 
Kyoto Protocol, were more important in the 1990s, while in 2006-2011, more general 
mitigation targets and REDD have seen most submissions. The topic of adaptation, in 
theory very important for the subsistence of small island states, is generally less 
prominent in the submissions than mitigation, probably because it is a less contentious 
topic than mitigation targets. Surprisingly, finance and technology appear to have been 
more important in the two first periods than in the last one in relative terms, although in 
recent years negotiations on a new financial mechanism of the Convention have gained in 
relevance. Not surprisingly, submissions regarding a protocol were important in the 1990s 
(towards Kyoto) and from 2006 on (new protocol, or reform of Kyoto). 
--- figure 3 about here --- 
Overall, this descriptive analysis hints towards a reduced importance of AOSIS group 
submissions in the latest negotiation round, while at the same time the different 
negotiation topics have varied in importance, or new topics have emerged. Does the 
decrease in group submissions simply reflect shifts in the climate change agenda, or is 
there a genuine time trend toward individual rather than group activity? 
A more detailed analysis of the topics for which group or individual submissions 
predominate can shed light on this question. Keyword counts in submissions by countries 
reveal that AOSIS as a group remains prominent in submissions related to adaptation or 
vulnerability, financial support, and technology or capacity building. If, in contrast, 
individual submissions are considered as an indicator of possible diverging positions 
within the group, some topics show a larger dispersion of interests: with respect to 
mitigation commitments, Tuvalu, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Dominican Republic 
are the most active AOSIS countries, followed by Solomon Islands and Singapore, mainly 
in the period 2006-2011. However, this does not indicate divergence. A more detailed 
analysis (see below) reveals that many of these individual submissions are used to reiterate 
and reinforce group positions, such as the demand for emissions cuts in the order of 40% 
compared to 1990 levels. Land-use and forestry issues were mentioned most frequently by 
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Tuvalu, followed by Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Dominican Republic, Solomon 
Islands, Belize, and Singapore. The interest of most of these countries in the forestry 
sector seems to have started only during the 2006-2011 period, which points towards a 
special focus on REDD – and here, individual submissions indeed point toward different 
viewpoints, with different countries proposing divergent ways of dealing with forests. The 
word “market” follows a very similar pattern to the terms related to forestry. 
Interestingly, both for forestry and markets, some individual countries appear to be more 
active than AOSIS as a group, as revealed by the fact that the word counts are larger for 
these individual countries than for AOSIS group submissions (see e.g. Figure 6 below). 
 
Oral interventions 
The analysis of the oral interventions in the negotiations, as reported in the ENBs, 
shows similar patterns. Table 3 compares the topics that, according to the ENB coding, 
were most relevant for AOSIS as a group and for the AOSIS countries that intervened 
more than ten times in the period between Bali and Copenhagen. While AOSIS as a group 
has participated repeatedly on topics such as adaptation, mitigation, finance and capacity 
building or technology transfer, which are of general interest to all vulnerable countries, it 
has made very few group interventions on LULUCF and REDD. Some individual AOSIS 
members, however, have participated actively in the LULUCF and REDD discussions, 
among them Tuvalu, Papua New Guinea, Guyana, Singapore and Micronesia. 
--- table 3 about here --- 
The coding of the ENBs also shows some instances in which AOSIS member countries 
have openly held opposing positions in the negotiations. In the Bonn meeting in August 
2009, Papua New Guinea and Tuvalu were reported to have opposing views on LULUCF 
accounting and on LULUCF eligibility under the CDM (Fry, 2008). The forestry sector 
thus appears to be one of the contentious issues among SIDS. But other issues have also 
generated disagreement: In the Bangkok meeting in October 2009, Singapore joined some 
non-AOSIS countries in proposing that the International Civil Aviation Organization and 
the International Maritime Organization take the lead in regulating emissions from 
aviation and maritime transport (which was later supported by Cook Islands13), whereas 
Tuvalu and Micronesia suggested that such regulations need to be guided by the 
Convention. At COP15, Papua New Guinea reportedly stated that they did not support 
the AOSIS proposal for a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol and an additional protocol 
to enhance action under the Convention. 
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Country delegations 
Over time, the delegations of small island states to the UNFCCC meetings have grown 
importantly in size, as shown in Table 4. Especially for COP meetings in which 
important decisions are expected, the aggregated AOSIS delegation has become quite 
large. If coordination among AOSIS members is high, such a delegation is an important 
resource for small island states. Closer analysis shows that the growth in delegation size 
has not been equal across AOSIS members – Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, 
Micronesia and Tuvalu are the countries that have had the largest delegations at some 
point and are thus the focus of the analysis below.  
These differences across AOSIS members could be due simply to different economic or 
human resources, or different ways of dealing with national delegations14, but they could 
also signal a diversification of interests within some AOSIS members as the negotiations 
progressed.15 Broadly, the core of the delegations should be composed of representatives 
from agencies related to environment, climate change and meteorology, and the foreign 
service, which have traditionally negotiated the climate change issue. Many 
representatives from the ministry of finance, economy or development may be an 
indicator of concerns about how to finance climate-related action. Representatives from 
other governmental sectors or from business may indicate the existence of other interests.  
--- table 4 about here ---  
Figure 4 shows our findings in terms of the composition by sector of the delegations of 
the five countries mentioned above. Changes over time and differences across delegations 
become evident. Indeed, delegates from “environment or foreign affairs” make up the 
largest part of the delegations analysed. Concerns about climate change impacts and 
reliance on career diplomats explain a large part of the selected countries’ delegations. 
From the other governmental sectors, Singapore is the only country in the sample that 
includes representatives of the energy sector (since 2001), and Papua New Guinea and 
Singapore the only ones with representatives from agriculture (since 2006).  
--- figure 4 about here --- 
Looking beyond sectors, Figure 5 shows the composition of the five delegations during 
2006-2011. The differences across countries become more evident. Specialists on forestry, 
the CDM and carbon markets appear only in the delegation of Papua New Guinea, while 
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references to energy and aviation or maritime transport seem important only for the 
delegation of Singapore.  
Such differences confirm differenct priorities across AOSIS member countries. While 
climate change and environmental considerations are still the most important topic 
among all delegations, more specific issues such as carbon markets, forests and emissions 
from energy and transport seem to be relevant agenda items for certain countries, among 
them Papua New Guinea and Singapore.  
--- figure 5 about here --- 
In summary, while some topics appear thus to be negotiated by AOSIS as a group, 
others seem to be negotiated by individual member countries. However, this analysis still 
cannot show whether these observations reflect a divergence in interests, or a strategy of 
specialization between them. A closer look at the issue areas of adaptation, mitigation, 
LULUCF and REDD help to better understand the implications of the observed changes. 
 
5.2. Positions on adaptation and mitigation 
Unsurprisingly, adaptation and mitigation figure prominently among the issues of 
relatively high importance to AOSIS. Of a total of 176 submissions produced by the 
group or its members since 1995, 17% are dedicated to mitigation, and 11% to adaptation. 
If one considers that the early AOSIS protocol proposals were mainly focused on 
mitigation, and the more recent ones have very important components of both adaptation 
and mitigation, then these figures would grow further. Whether these figures suggest a 
stronger interest of AOSIS for mitigation than for adaptation measures, or whether 
mitigation has simply been a more contested issue due to the evolution of the 
negotiations, cannot be concluded clearly from the analysis of submission counts. 
However, some evidence does point out that the relative importance of mitigation versus 
adaptation varies across AOSIS member countries, which supports the idea that the SIDS 
are not an entirely homogeneous block. For example, a Maldives representative specified 
in an interview that more money contributed by Annex I countries should be earmarked 
for adaptation, where there is no market.16 On the contrary, some countries such as Papua 
New Guinea, Grenada, or Vanuatu do not concede much space to adaptation in their 
individual submissions or those jointly with non-AOSIS countries. Papua New Guinea, 
for example, gives adaptation only room for 0.25% of its statements, while mitigation gets 
much more attention (31%; forest receives most attention, with 40% of statements). This 
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echoes an interview with a delegation member of Papua New Guinea, who ranked the 
contact group on enhanced action on mitigation as the most important for the country, 
while the contact group on enhanced action on adaptation is not among the three top-
priority contact groups.17 At the opposite end of the spectrum is Comoros, which does 
not consider mitigation in its individual submissions at all, while 63% of the statements 
have adaptation as the central topic.  
This is a first indication that differences regarding mitigation and adaptation exist 
wtihin AOSIS. As described above, there is also a change in the relative importance of 
group and individual submissions on mitigation and adaptation over time. During the first 
period from 1995 to 2000, 89% of references in the written submissions to adaptation and 
71% of references to mitigation were made on behalf of the group (figures based on 
keyword counts). The picture for the second time period, 2001 to 2005, seems relatively 
stable, with 72% of all statements in the submissions concerning mitigation and 64% of 
those concerning adaptation made on behalf of the group. A downward trend in group 
submissions becomes clearer in the third period from 2006 to 2011. A division is 
particularly pronounced for mitigation, with only 19% of references in written 
submissions made on behalf of the group. Tuvalu (21%) and Papua New Guinea (11%) are 
leading with regard to the number of individual and joint statements. During this period, 
23 of AOSIS members submitted their individual views to the UNFCCC on mitigation 
issues, while during the 2001 to 2006 negotiation stage only four members felt the need to 
draft individual submission. The same trend, although less pronounced, is observed for 
adaptation, with 43% of references made on behalf of the group in the final negotiation 
phase. Again Tuvalu, accounting for 31% of all statements made by AOSIS members 
during that time period, is leading the pack. Regarding adaptation, 19 AOSIS members 
decided to express their views in individual submissions between 2006 and 2011 
(significantly more than between 2001 and 2005, when only 7 members made individual 
submission).  
Do these results imply the decline of within-group unity regarding mitigation and 
adaptation? A deeper analysis of the positions displayed by SIDS on emission reduction 
targets for Annex I countries and on adaptation measures does not support such a 
divergence of positions. Analysing the last negotiation period, AOSIS as a group calls for 
an aggregate emission reduction of at least 40% by 2020 in the developed world, a view 
which is reflected in most individual submissions of AOSIS members, although the 
Maldives were calling for even more stringent targets of 45%.18 There also seems to be 
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broad agreement that mitigation efforts should be based on historic responsibilities. On 
mitigation, therefore, a higher level of fragmentation during the last negotiation period 
cannot be deduced. Individual submissions are either used to reiterate the view of the 
whole group, or to promote particular ideas. An example for the latter would be 
Micronesia’s repeated submissions on “fast start mitigation strategies”.19. Finally, Tuvalu 
used its individual submissions on mitigation inter alia to raise the pressure on Annex I 
parties by illustrating that these countries contributed approximately 75% of all 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions to date.20 In terms of adaptation, the positions displayed in 
group and in individual submissions also evidence high agreement among AOSIS 
members. Sometimes individual submissions are at the forefront of positions that are later 
adopted by the whole group, such as in the case of extending the share of proceeds to 
finance adaptation also to Joint Implementation and to Emissions Trading, which has 
been pursued by Tuvalu, supported then by individual SIDS and later taken up by the 
whole group.21 Sometimes, individual submissions reinforce what has been already 
proposed in group submissions, or provide more detail on specific aspects, such as on the 
institutional framework for adaptation or on the insurance mechanism. Thus, individual 
submissions on mitigation and adaptation seem to reflect an extra effort of small island 
states to corroborate their positions, but do not back the hypothesis of increased disunity 
within AOSIS. 
A special case, however, exists on submissions about how to treat the Copenhagen 
Accord. Submissions by individual SIDS in 2010 evidence strong disagreements on 
whether the text of the Copenhagen Accord should be used for future negotiations under 
the Convention: while several countries (Barbados, Belize, Maldives, Marshall Islands, 
Singapore) mention that contents of the Copenhagen Accord should flow into the 
negotiations (albeit with improvements), others, such as Cuba and Tuvalu are strongly 
against it: “it is Tuvalu’s firm view that the Copenhagen Accord should not be the basis 
for, or have any influencing role, on the Chair’s text. The Copenhagen Accord is a 
fundamentally flawed document”.22 Indeed, in an interview in 2010, an AOSIS delegate, 
commented that there may be “some degree of concern amongst the AOSIS members that 
maybe there was some betrayal, maybe there was some breach of the common trust” 
when some members associated with the Copenhagen Accord.23 However, the same 
delegate explained that AOSIS as a group had to move on from such disagreement and 
keep firm on its main negotiation goals. 
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5.3. Positions on LULUCF and REDD 
The general analysis of submissions by AOSIS countries over the period 1995-2011 has 
revealed a noticeable evolution in the importance of the forestry negotiation topics for 
this group of countries. The forestry negotiations encompass rules for how industrialized 
countries should account for the sequestration or emission of greenhouse gases from 
forests and other land-use activities in their emission inventories and in their emission 
reduction targets (negotiations on LULUCF), rules for what types of forestry and land-
use activities should be included in the CDM (LULUCF in the CDM), and, more 
recently, rules on a possible new mechanism to address emissions from deforestation and 
land degradation in developing countries (REDD negotiations24). As explained above and 
shown in Figure 6, individual SIDS seem to be more active than AOSIS as a group in the 
discussions about forestry issues, particularly in the period from 2006 on.  
--- figure 6 about here --- 
The negotiations on forestry-related issues reveal a divide within the AOSIS members, 
which started to exist already in the early negotiations in the 1990s. Between 1998 and 
2002, AOSIS as a group made five written submissions related to LULUCF, which reveal 
a consistently strict position regarding how land-use and forestry activities should be 
considered both by the industrialized countrie as part of their mitigation efforts, and by 
developing countries under the CDM. Two quotes make this clear: “AOSIS is in favour of 
very strict considerations to be met if land use change and forestry activities are to be 
included in the mitigation efforts of the industrialised countries”;25 “the primary priority 
should rest with the reduction of emissions and that enhancement of sinks is an additional 
activity in the short term”.26 A joint submission by Samoa and Tuvalu and an individual 
submission by Tuvalu, both from 2000, support this strictness. In addition, Tuvalu asks 
for limited acceptability of LULUCF activities as Joint Implementation projects, and for 
no LULUCF activities in the CDM during the first commitment period, due to concerns 
about environmental integrity, accounting and institutional issues.27 On the other hand, 
the Dominican Republic, with a group of Latin American countries, made two 
submissions proposing which forestry activities should be included in the CDM. These 
proposals were much more lenient than those of AOSIS as a group: they not only state 
that LULUCF activities should be eligible as CDM projects, but also ask for an inclusion 
of activities that slow, reduce or avoid deforestation, including forest management.28 
These submissions thus point toward a certain fragmentation, and indicate that individual 
self-interests may dominate group cohesion on this issue.  
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The division becomes clearer in the later submissions regarding LULUCF from 2009 
on: in this period, no joint AOSIS submission exists on the topic; instead, there are a host 
of individual submissions by Belize, Tuvalu, Singapore and Papua New Guinea,, as well as 
a joint submission by Guyana and Papua New Guinea with a large group of other (non-
AOSIS) non-Annex I countries. These submissions point towards diverging interests and 
opinions.29 It appears likely that AOSIS countries could not agree on a group submission 
about LULUCF after 2009, so that individual countries have submitted their positions 
independently from each other.  
With regard to REDD, the fragmentation of opinions within AOSIS is even more 
pronounced. The concept of reducing emissions from deforestation was first introduced in 
the negotiations jointly by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica at COP11 in Montreal in 
2005.30 Parties agreed to start discussing the topic as a new agenda item, and launched a 2-
year consultation process. At COP13, reducing emissions from forest degradation was 
also included in the discussions, giving place to REDD. Since then, negotiations have 
continued on how to address the methodological issues required to measure emission 
reductions from deforestation and forest degradation, and on how to generate positive 
incentives to halt these emissions (Fry, 2008; Sanz-Sanchez, 2011).  
All submissions from SIDS regarding this topic have been made either by individual 
countries or by distinct groups of countries. No group AOSIS submission exists on 
REDD. Diverging opinions mainly concern questions about whether emission reduction 
from REDD activities should be used as offsets in the carbon market in a CDM-type or a 
sectoral mechanism, whether and how early action by countries that have already made 
efforts to preserve their forests should be recognized, and how to address the balance of 
supply and demand for carbon credits in the market (on REDD, see Martinet and 
Christovam, 2009; Verchot and Petkova, 2010). Belize, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, 
Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Suriname and Vanuatu are generally 
pro-markets, pro-recognition of early action and concerned about prices for carbon 
offsets. Tuvalu, on the other hand, makes clear in several submissions that it is against the 
inclusion of REDD activities in the carbon market, even in the form of pilot projects, and 
against granting credits for early action. Instead, it made a proposal for a non-market 
REDD mechanism.31 
With regard to forestry, then, there is a divide between AOSIS members. The number 
of individual submissions indicates disagreement and fragmentation, rather than serving to 
strengthen a common position as was the case for mitigation.   
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6. Concluding Remarks: AOSIS’ role in the future: unity versus 
fragmentation?  
While tensions clearly exist, AOSIS remains a tightly coordinated negotiation coalition 
in the climate change process. Its members are acutely aware of their need for a strong 
unified voice to convince other, larger countries of ambitious action on climate change. 
As one interviewee emphasizes, “we can’t fight amongst ourselves, because we are not the 
enemy.”32 Nonetheless, AOSIS member states are affected by climate change and climate 
policies in different ways. It is thus not surprising to note that different AOSIS countries 
accord different priorities to different agenda items, as for instance mitigation compared 
to adaptation or forestry-related issues.  
As the climate change agenda has grown since COP1, AOSIS member states 
increasingly participate in the negotiations as individual parties rather than on behalf of 
the coalition. In particular, some areas such as LULUCF and REDD, are contentious 
within AOSIS and sometimes even provoke open confrontation. At first glance, this may 
suggest that AOSIS has become less cohesive and more fragmented over time. A more 
detailed analysis, however, indicates that many of the individual contributions reiterate 
and reinforce group positions. I sum, then, the Alliance has been able to uphold unity. 
Although interviewees comment on internal controversies and criticism, they seem to feel 
overall that SIDS are a relatively homogenous group with little disagreement.33 Differences 
in priorities and capacities are even harnessed, as the Samoan interviewee explains. Some 
low-lying atoll countries like Tuvalu are more vulnerable than Samoa, he says, so “the 
best we can do for Tuvalu is to give them their space. Because people will listen more to 
Tuvalu than to us.”34 
Indeed, Tuvalu’s voice and that of AOSIS are listened to in the climate change 
negotiations. In Durban, the Alliance joined forces with other vulnerable and progressive 
countries, and was able to obtain many of its goals, especially regarding adaptation, 
finance, technology transfer and capacity building. On mitigation, however, the so-called 
Durban Package “falls well short of what these countries wanted – and need to avoid 
catastrophic climate change impacts” (Wold, 2012).  
AOSIS remains a key player in global climate policy and one of the most active 
proponents of deep cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions. In spite of a proliferation of 
issues in the UNFCCC process, the core of AOSIS negotiating position is strong and 
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urgent enough to keep the Alliance together. Unfortunately, however, emissions cuts 
need to come from larger countries that are reluctant to pay heed to the warnings of 
AOSIS. As cohesive as the Alliance thus may be, at the end of the day, action must come 
from other countries.    
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Endnotes 
1. Interview with delegate from an AOSIS member country, 4th June 2010, Bonn. 
2. Figures are for 2009, and for 2005 for emissions, see Betzold (2010).  
3. See rule 22.1 of the draft Rules of Procedure (FCCC/CP/1996/2), or UNFCCC 
website at 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/convention_bodies/bureau/item
s/3431.php. 
4. These seats are hard fought for, as two anonymous reviewers stressed. See CMP1 
decisions (FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1), decision 1/CMP.4 
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2008/11/Add.2) and decision 1/CP.16 
(FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1). 
5. We thank Joyeeta Gupta for bringing up this point. 
6. As two anonymous reviewers pointed out, submissions are often called for on 
technical issues or where progress is difficult to obtain, so that comparisons across 
topics may be biased. Despite this, submissions still can highlight differences in 
priorities or perspectives among parties on the issues on which submissions are 
available. 
7. See the UNFCCC website at http://unfccc.int/meetings/archive/items/2749.php. 
8. All lists of participants are available online from the UNFCCC website at 
http://unfccc.int/documentation/documents /items/3595.php. 
9. The ENB can only report on negotiation sessions open to observers. Our coding thus 
assumes that the positions and behaviour revealed in these open sessions are good 
proxies for the overall negotiation behaviour of parties. 
10. Group submissions are typically submitted by the Chair of the Alliance on behalf of 
AOSIS and were hence counted as a submission by AOSIS and not as a submission by 
the country holding the Chair. Submissions made by two or more AOSIS members 
jointly were counted more than once. 
11. It should be noted that among the most active AOSIS countries tend to be those who 
invite highly skilled external experts to join their delegation. Tuvalu’s activism, for 
example, can be attributed to its chief negotiator Ian Fry, an Australian-born former 
Greenpeace activist. Other examples are Kevin Conrad, Papua New Guinea’s UN 
Special Envoy and Ambassador for Climate Change and Environment, or a 
representative of the Foundation of International Environmental Law and 
Development serving on Micronesia’s delegation. Thus, it seems that skilled 
leadership and outside expertise play an important role for small island states in the 
climate change negotiations.  
12. The data and detailed analysis are not shown due to space reasons, but are available 
from the authors on request. 
13. See submission by Cook Islands in FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2/Add.1, p.8-9. 
14. While some countries strictly include only members of government in their national 
delegations, others are open to including representatives of civil society or NGOs 
even in cases where these do not contribute directly to the negotiations. Hence, the 
size of the delegation is by itself not a good indicator of bargaining resources of the 
party. 
15. An alternative explanation could be that, faced with limited resources, countries 
within the AOSIS coalition coordinate the composition of their national delegations 
so that overall they have experts in all negotiation topics across all SIDS, who can 
inform each other about the progress in each topic. Even in this case, having the 
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experts for one particular topic may be a sign of salience of this topic for a particular 
country. 
16. Interview with delegate from the Maldives, 10th June 2010, Bonn. This view is also 
reflected in the only individual submission discussing mitigation made by the 
Maldives, which states that “the required level of financial resources [for adaptation] 
should be assessed in light of other elements of the proposed outcome for Cancun 
including the expected global goal, Annex I mitigation efforts and the likely resulting 
impacts on developing countries” (see document FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2, p. 
69). A higher mitigation effort in the developed world, thus, would lead to lower 
financial needs for adaptation. Given that the Maldives call for higher targets that the 
rest of AOSIS (45% instead of 40%), this is congruent with the statement made in the 
interview that mitigation should be prioritized over adaptation. 
17. Phone interview with delegate from an AOSIS member country, 13th October 2009. 
18. Submission by the Maldives in document FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2, p. 69. 
19. See for example submission by Micronesia in document 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.1, p. 41. 
20. Submission by Tuvalu in document FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/MISC.1/Add.1, p. 10-14. 
21. The CDM, Joint Implementation and Emissions Trading are instruments of the 
Kyoto Protocol that provide flexibility in terms of where to achieve emission 
reductions. Currently, a 2% share of proceeds from the CDM is used to finance 
adaptation, but such a levy is not applied to Joint Implementation or Emissions 
Trading. See proposal by Tuvalu for an International Blueprint on Adaptation in 
FCCC/CP/2007/Misc.2, and subsequent submissions supporting the share of 
proceeds expansion in FCCC/SBI/2008/MISC.10, FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4, 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.8 and FCCC/CP/2010/3. It should be noted 
however that having a share of proceeds for adaptation from all three Kyoto 
mechanisms was already an AOSIS position during the negotiations towards the 
Marrakesh Accords in 2001. 
22. Submissions contained in documents FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.1, 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2, FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2/Add.1 and 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2/Add.2. Tuvalu’s quote is from the last document 
listed, p.6. 
23. Interview with delegate from an AOSIS member country, 11th April 2010, Bonn. 
24. The REDD negotiations have been expanded to include also negotiations on the 
conservation and enhancement of forests and on sustainable forest management, 
which is usually known as “REDD+”. Some countries also support the inclusion of 
other land-related activities in the REDD mechanism, such as agriculture and related 
soil carbon content, which is known by experts as “REDD++”. For simplicity, in 
this article we will generally refer to all these topics as REDD negotiations.  
25. Submission by AOSIS in document FCCC/CP/1998/MISC.1, p. 47.  
26. Submission by AOSIS in document FCCC/SBSTA/1999/MISC.2, p. 47. 
27. Submission by Tuvalu in document FCCC/SB/2000/MISC.1/Add.2. 
28. Submissions in documents FCCC/SB/1999/MISC.10/Add.3 and 
FCCC/SB/2000/MISC.1/Add.2. 
29. The topics of these submissions are mostly technical, e.g. how to better account for 
LULUCF emissions, what types of activities should be included in LULUCF (in 
general and in the CDM), and what reference levels should be used to determine 
LULUCF emissions. 
30. Submission by Papua New Guinea and Panama in document 
FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1, p. 2-11. 
31. Submissions by Tuvalu in documents FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2/Add.1 and 
FCCC/SBSTA/2009/MISC.1/Add.1. 
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32. Interview with delegate from an AOSIS member country, 4th April 2010, Bonn.  
33. Interview with delegate from an AOSIS member country, 4th April 2010, Bonn; 
Interview with delegate from an AOSIS member country, 4th June 2010, Bonn. 
34. Interview with delegate from an AOSIS member country, 4th June 2010, Bonn.  
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Figure 1: country groups in the climate change negotiations. 
 
Source: Adapted from Castro et al. (2011, p. 6). 
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Figure 2: count of AOSIS and AOSIS member written submissions. 
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Figure 3: main topics of AOSIS and AOSIS member written submissions 
(percentage of total submissions within the period). 
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Figure 4: composition of selected AOSIS member delegations, by sector (percentage 
of total delegates in analysed meetings). 
 
Note: See Appendix A for a description of how sectors were coded. Source: participant 
lists to UNFCCC meetings. 
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Figure 5: representation of interest groups in selected AOSIS member delegations 
(keyword counts in analyzed meetings). 
 
Note: See Appendix A for a description of how sectors were coded. Source: participant 
lists to UNFCCC meetings. 
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Figure 6: word counts in AOSIS and AOSIS member submissions 
(LULUCF/REDD/forest), per period. 
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 Table 1: Negotiation topics and respective keywords 
Negotiation topic Keywords Negotiation topic Keywords 
Adaptation Adapt Market mechanisms Market 
  Vulner Finance and support Support 
Mitigation Mitig  Financ 
 Reduc   Fund 
 Commitm Technology transfer, capacity building Technol 
  Target   Capacity 
LULUCF and REDD LULUCF Impact of response measures Response  
 REDD  measure 
  Forest   
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Table 2: Negotiation meetings in which the participant lists were coded 
Meeting Location/Date Importance 
COP1 Berlin, April 1995 First COP, UNFCCC entered into force 
SB61 Bonn, August 1997 Year in which Kyoto Protocol was adopted 
COP3 Kyoto, December 1997 Adoption of the Kyoto Protocol 
SB12 Bonn, June 2000 Negotiations on the detailed rules of the Kyoto Protocol 
COP6 The Hague, November 2000 Negotiations on the detailed rules of the Kyoto Protocol 
COP6bis Bonn, July 2001 Negotiations on the detailed rules of the Kyoto Protocol 
COP7 Marrakesh, October 2001 Adoption of the Marrakesh Accords (detailed rules of the 
Kyoto Protocol) 
SB22 Bonn, May 2005 Year in which the Kyoto Protocol entered into force 
COP11 Montreal, December 2005 The Kyoto Protocol enters into force; initiation of the 
negotiations towards a second commitment period (Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for 
Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol, AWG-KP) 
COP13 Bali, December 2007 Adoption of the Bali Action Plan; initiation of the 
negotiations towards a comprehensive long-term climate 
agreement (Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperation under the Convention, AWG-LCA) 
SB28 Bonn, June 2008 AWG-KP and AWG-LCA continue 
COP14 Poznan, December 2008 AWG-KP and AWG-LCA continue 
SB30 Bonn, June 2009 AWG-KP and AWG-LCA continue 
COP15 Copenhagen, December 2009 AWG-KP and AWG-LCA are supposed to finish their 
work; Copenhagen Accord 
SB32 Bonn, June 2010 AWG-KP and AWG-LCA continue 
COP16 Cancún, December 2010  Cancún Agreements 
Note: This table does not list all negotiation meetings, but just some of the most important ones, coded 
for this analysis. For a full list of negotiation meetings, refer to 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/archive/items/2749.php. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                    
1 SB stands for subsidiary bodies. The Convention has two subsidiary bodies, the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). They usually 
meet during the COPs as well as every June in Bonn.  
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Table 3: Number of oral interventions of most active AOSIS countries per 
negotiation topic, December 2007 – December 2009 
Country Adaptation, 
vulnerability 
Mitigation, 
compliance 
Kyoto 
flexibility 
mechanisms 
Sectoral 
mechanisms, 
national 
policies 
Monitoring, 
reporting 
and 
verification 
LULUC
F 
REDD Finance Capacity 
building, 
tech. 
transfer, 
R&D 
Conse-
quences 
climate 
policies 
Shared 
vision 
AOSIS 51 76 26 1 12 3 1 65 32 8 14 
Tuvalu 7 40 27 7 2 20 16 16 0 4 3 
Singapore 1 23 5 3 1 0 2 0 0 3 1 
Micronesia 4 17 8 4 4 1 0 1 0 0 1 
PNG 0 5 3 0 0 10 18 3 1 0 0 
Guyana 1 3 0 0 0 1 15 2 2 0 1 
Barbados 2 3 0 1 0 0 0 4 2 4 2 
Note: PNG stands for Papua New Guinea. Source: Earth Negotiation Bulletins (IISD, 2007-2009), own 
coding.  
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Table 4: Number of delegates from AOSIS countries participating in UNFCCC 
meetings, descriptive statistics (1995 – 2010, selected meetings) 
Meeting Date 
Total 
AOSIS 
Share of 
all party 
total 
Mean 
per 
country 
Min per 
country 
Max per 
country 
St. Dev. 
Country/ies with most 
delegates 
COP1 April 1995 67 8.85% 2.09 1 5 1.18 
Micronesia, Papua 
New Guinea 
SB62 August 1997 31 n/a 1.55 1 5 1.02 Singapore 
COP3 
December 
1997 
115 7.50% 3.83 1 15 2.98 Micronesia 
SB12 June 2000 39 4.84% 1.56 1 5 0.98 Samoa 
COP6 
November 
2000 
153 6.97% 4.25 1 12 2.49 Micronesia 
COP6bis July 2001 117 6.45% 3.34 1 9 2.19 
Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa 
COP7 October 2001 61 2.53% 2.26 1 6 1.35 Samoa 
SB22 May 2005 45 4.86% 1.61 1 5 1.08 Tuvalu 
COP11 
December 
2005 
137 4.89% 3.91 1 15 3.13 Papua New Guinea 
COP13 
December 
2007 
344 9.81% 9.05 1 61 11.80 Singapore 
SB28 June 2008 94 7.15% 2.76 1 17 2.67 Singapore 
COP14 
December 
2008 
220 5.56% 5.64 1 27 5.56 Singapore 
SB30 June 2009 121 6.92% 3.36 1 19 3.71 Singapore 
COP15 
December 
2009 
638 6.03% 16.36 5 82 14.43 Papua New Guinea 
SB32 June 2010 143 8.57% 3.86 1 28 4.62 Singapore 
COP16 
December 
2010 
418 8.06% 11.00 3 41 9.33 Singapore 
Source: participant lists to UNFCCC meetings. 
 
 
                                                    
2 SB stands for subsidiary bodies. The Convention has two subsidiary bodies, the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). They usually 
meet during the COPs as well as every June in Bonn.  
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Appendix A: Coding rules for the participant lists 
Sector Coding rules for Figure 4 
Environment / Foreign Affairs 
 
Whenever "climate change", “environment”, or “foreign” is included in name of ministry, or for the “Ministry of Sustainable 
Development”. Also includes all heads of state, and whenever a diplomat (e.g. ambassador) or a diplomatic mission ("permanent 
mission", “embassy”) is mentioned. Also whenever a climate change council, office or agency or an environmental or 
meteorological agency or service is mentioned without specifying another ministry.  
Finance / Business Whenever "finance", "economic", "development" or "planning" is included in name of ministry, except if "environment” is also 
there. Also: Ministry of Infrastructure, of Home Affairs. Includes also utilities, carbon consultancies (even international ones), 
business associations, etc. 
Energy Whenever "energy" is included in name of ministry, except if "economic" or "finance" or "environment" is also there. 
Agriculture Whenever "agriculture" or "forest" or similar is included in name of ministry, except if "environment" or "economic" is also 
there. Also includes national parks or other conservation agencies, or land management agencies, whenever the word 
"environment" is not included. 
Other government Whenever it is clear that the delegate is from the national government (other ministries, parliament, local governments, various 
agencies) but not from any of the above. 
International cooperation & NGOs Includes bilateral cooperation agencies or projects thereof (e.g. GTZ), UN or non-UN international agencies (e.g. ACP 
secretary, Coalition of Rainforest Nations, Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre, UNDP, UNEP national offices, 
etc.), domestic and international NGOs, also those that may be acting as advisors to the government, if mentioning the name of 
the NGO. Includes also youth representatives. 
Note: Delegates serving security, protocol or logistic purposes, from media, university, research institutions or without clear affiliation were not included in the 
analysis. 
  
Additional categories used in Figure 5 (which may denote specific interests, but can overlap with the previous ones) 
Climate change, meteorology, 
vulnerability 
Count of "national communication", "snc", "focal point", "point focal", "punto focal", "clima", "meteor", "météo", "adapt", 
"vulnerab", "disaster" and "desastre" within the delegates' affiliations. 
CDM, carbon markets Count of "carbon", "mechanism" and "mecanismo" within the delegates' affiliations. 
Energy Count of "energy" within the delegates' affiliations. 
Aviation, maritime, transport Count of "avia", "maritim" and "transport" within the delegates' affiliations. 
Forestry Count of "forest" and "bosque" within the delegates' affiliations. 
 
 
